Cronin, Bruce (2001) “The Paradox of Hegemony: America`s Ambiguous Relationship with the United Nations,” European Journal of International Relations, Issue 7, No. 1, pp. 103-130. Similarly, States will reassess their compliance with international law when treaties are discredited by scandals or accession disputes. Prosperous nations like Japan, which are “whaling”, have been accused by some states and NGOs of “buying votes” from poor member states.  As a result, the International Whaling Commission has been compelled to improve transparency and improve the efficiency of its activities.  If the allegations were true, states could be induced to comply with a law for immoral reasons (intentional corruption) (by becoming members of the treaty). Inland Switzerland can also vote on whaling issues for which it has little or no authority over such an issue.  A dilemma illustrated by Goldsmith and Posner is that the state may have obligations under international law, but that these obligations would have no influence on the behavior of states, except in the interests of citizens (in democracies) or autocrats (in autocracies).  Ultimately, states can follow international law, but the legal status of the treaty has no real influence on doing so.
Therefore, personal interest is probably a factor in how nations behave. The evolution of international law and accepted norms over the past 400 years has influenced the conduct of the State. The effect has repeatedly shown that States behave reliably with international law most of the time. The main problem was that it was much more difficult to prove a causal link between the legal commitment and the conduct.  Key theories provide convincing explanations. However, the number of variables affecting the behavior of a state distorts the analysis. No theory is able to properly explain why States are obliged to justify their conduct in accordance with recognized legal rules and norms. The best explanation is to interpret the problem as a process that takes into account all theories.
The process can be declared as an ongoing interaction between States, which involves the creation and development of contractual norms within the framework of an ongoing dialogue. Over time, standards and practices evolve in the international system.  This procedural argument is similar to a constructivist argument. However, the strategy also takes into account the interest of the State, the type of regime, international society and the internal environment within States, in order to identify all likely variables.  Ultimately, the most compelling argument for why all states, weak and strong, behave according to accepted legal rules and norms is the interpretation of the main theories and variables that can influence state behavior.  Simmons, Beth (1998) “Compliance with International Agreements,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1, p. 75.
States are trying to deal with friction with the current respect by the principle of pacta sunt servanda – respect for agreements.  Over time, such agreements on norms and treaties have reduced sovereignty, expanded international institutions, given rise to non-state actors, and rapidly developed the system of contemporary usage and contracts. .